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1. Introduction 
In his earliest writings, Notes on Logic (NL), Moore Notes 
(MN) and Tractatus logico-philosophicus (TLP), Wittgen-
stein calls his conception of logic self-confident ―New Log-
ic‖. He opposes his New Logic to the ―Old Logic‖, which he 
identifies with the logic of Frege and Russell. From 1912 to 
1914 he confronted Russell with his work on New Logic. 
Soon Russell accepted Wittgenstein as his ―master‖ (Monk 
(1990), chapter 3). Russell and Whitehead wanted Witt-
genstein to work over Principia Mathematica (PM) (cf. 
Pinsent (1990), p. 60). Finally, Russell expected that the 
elaboration of Wittgenstein‘s New Logic would displace PM 
as paradigm of modern logic. This expectation was not 
fulfilled. The explanation for this is at hand: Wittgenstein‘s 
conception of logic could only be realized in propositional 
logic but not in predicate logic. In fact, no suggestions 
according proofs of predicate logic can be found in TLP. 
This seems to confirm the common judgement that Witt-
genstein‘s main contribution to logic consists in the devel-
opment of truth-tables, while his conception of logic is not 
able to supply any substantial contribution beyond proposi-
tional logic (cf. Black (1964), p. 323, Anscombe (1996), p. 
137, cf. also the footnote of the editors in Cambridge Let-
ters (CL), p. 52).  
Yet, it is not taken into account that Wittgenstein did 
not think of truth-tables as the proof method of his New 
Logic but of the so called ―ab-notation‖, a logical notation 
he worked on intensively in 1913/14. It is this notation he 
identifies with the ―new notation‖ in opposition to the ―old 
notation‖ of Frege and Russell (NL, p. 93[1]). The method 
of truth-tables – ―WF-schemata‖ in Wittgenstein's terminol-
ogy – was already worked out by Wittgenstein in 1912 (cf. 
Shosky (1997), p. 20). Contrary to the method of truth-
tables, Wittgenstein‘s intention by developing the ab-
notation was to realize his conception of logic in the realm 
of predicate logic (cf. CL, letter 28, p. 4, against Biggs 
(1996), p. 27). The question in how far Wittgenstein‘s New 
Logic can be realized depends first and foremost on the 
question in how far his ab-notation is applicable to predi-
cate logic. 
Unfortunately, the notebooks from 1913/14 dealing 
with the ab-notation have not been received (cf. CL, letter 
32, p. 58 and Biggs (1996), p. 11). Thus, one has to rely 
on the scanty remarks in NL, MN, CL from 1913/14. Fur-
thermore, the understanding of the ab-notation even in the 
realm of propositional logic was hampered by the fact that 
all received diagrams of the ab-notation were reproduced 
mistakenly or not even printed in the first editions of NL, 
MN, CL. In addition to the misjudgement that the method 
of truth-tables displaced the ab-notation this accounts for 
the fact that Wittgenstein‘s ab-notation remained nearly 
disregarded up to now in the literature. Yet, Wittgenstein 
did not doubt the validity of the ab-notation for the whole 
realm of predicate logic. Merely the handling of identity 
within the ab-notation was an open question for him (cf. 
CL, letter 30, p. 53). Likewise, he does not confine his 
understanding of logical proofs to propositional logic in 
TLP and still speaks of the ―Old Logic‖ in opposition to his 
―New Logic‖ (TLP 4.126, 6.125). It was not Wittgenstein‘s 
intention to work out in detail his conception of a New Log-
ic in TLP, but he had no doubt on the feasibility of this 
project. As the editors of CL point out rightly this contra-
dicts Church‘s theorem of the undecidability of predicate 
logic (cf. CL, p.52). However, one is unable to judge upon 
Wittgenstein‘s programme if one concludes from this that 
Wittgenstein‘s programme is doomed to failure. First of all, 
throughout his life Wittgenstein was critical about meta-
mathematical proofs and their methods – these proofs are 
not independent of the conception of Old Logic. Further-
more, merits and anomalies of the Wittgensteinian para-
digm can only be discussed in a logically and philosophi-
cally fruitful manner by elaborating it. This, in turn, presup-
poses an understanding of its main ideas. In what follows 
the objective of Wittgenstein‘s New Logic will be lined out 
in contrast to the Old Logic. The detailed elaboration of his 
programme of a New Logic is given in my book ―Wittgen-
stein‘s New Logic‖, which works out Wittgenstein‘s ab-
notation for first order logic. 
2. Old vs. New Logic 
In MN, p. 109[5] Wittgenstein describes the ―procedure of 
the old Logic‖ as follows: 
This is the actual procedure of [the] old Logic: it gives 
so-called primitive propositions; so-called rules of deduc-
tion; and then says that what you get by applying the 
rules to the propositions is a logical proposition that you 
have proved. 
This is just the common understanding of logical proofs in 
the sense of derivations within an axiomatic system. Fre-
ge‘s and Russell‘s systems satisfy this proof conception as 
well as modern sequence calculi do: A formula is proven 
by deducing it from the axioms applying derivation rules. 
Wittgenstein does not deny that logical true formula, tau-
tologies, can be identified by this procedure. Yet, he em-
phasizes that their logical truth cannot be proven this way. 
He goes on to say: 
The truth is, it tells you something about the kind of 
proposition you have got, viz that it can be derived from 
the first symbols by these rules of combination […]. 
What is proven by the axiomatic proof procedure is simply 
the deducibility of the formulae from the axioms. This is not 
denied within the framework of classical logic either. It is 
an accepted truism that only by assuming the logical truth 
of the axioms and the correctness of the derivation rules 
the logical truth of theorems can be concluded from their 
deducibility. Not the content of Wittgenstein‘s remark that 
proofs within an axiomatic system are in need of a meta-
logical justification is illuminating but the fact that he op-
poses his conception of a New Logic to this common un-
derstanding of logical proofs. Through his life Wittgenstein 
opposed to the understanding of logical and mathematical 
proofs resting on axioms, because one has to rely on 
some metalogical, intuitive evidence if one does not only 
want to maintain the deducibility of theorems but their logi-
cal or mathematical truth. In PG, p. 297 (cf. TLP 6.1271) 
he says: 
Logic and mathematics are not based on axioms, […]. 
The idea that they are involves the error of treating the 
intuitiveness, the self-evidence, of the fundamental 
propositions as a criterion for correctness in logic. 
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Axiomatic proofs do not deliver a purely syntactical criteri-
on for logical properties of arbitrary formulae of a formal 
system. The axioms are taken for granted without a formal 
proof. They hold an exceptional position within the system, 
but this position is not justified syntactically – the axioms 
are formulae within the system and do not differ essentially 
from other formulae. This can be seen by the fact that 
there are several correct and complete axiom systems for 
the same formal system and by the fact that not all axioms 
have some syntactical feature in common that identifies 
them as axioms. The common understanding of logical 
proofs in the sense of derivations from axioms depends on 
proofs of the logical truth of the axioms and of the correct-
ness and completeness of a calculus relative to some prior 
given semantics. Such proofs cannot be carried out within 
formal logic. Thus, the question arises to the metalogical 
justification of an axiomatic calculus. Such a foundation 
necessarily exceeds the limitations of admissible evidence 
in logic. One objective of Wittgenstein's New Logic is to 
replace axiomatic proof procedures by a proof procedure 
that is not in need of such a metalogical foundation. In TLP 
6.1265f. he says: 
It is always possible to construe logic in such a way that 
every proposition is its own proof. 
All the propositions of logic are of equal status: it is not 
the case that some of them are essentially primitive 
propositions and others essentially derived propositions. 
Every tautology itself shows that it is a tautology. 
That logical propositions are ―their own proof‖ or tautolo-
gies ―show themselves‖ to be tautologies does not mean 
that there is no need for proofs in the sense of manipula-
tions of formulae in order to identify tautologies as tautolo-
gies. It only means that this can be done by relying solely 
on the formulae themselves as starting points of the proof 
instead of relying on axioms. In this respect Wittgenstein 
was looking for something similar to tableaux procedures 
such as Beth‘s or Smullyan‘s procedure (cf. Beth (1962), 
Smullyan (1965)). Yet, contrary to these procedures New 
Logic does not only aim for a procedure in order to identify 
tautologies but for a procedure applicable to ―every propo-
sition‖, i.e. any predicate formula, in order to identify its 
truth conditions. In Wittgenstein‘s conception proofs in the 
sense of derivations of theorems from axioms are replaced 
by proofs in the sense of converting formulae to symbols of 
an ideal notation that allow to identify unambiguously tau-
tologies and, generally, the truth conditions of any formula 
by the syntactical features of the ideal symbols. Again and 
again Wittgenstein stresses that one has to identify tautol-
ogies ―from the symbol alone‖ (TLP 6.113) or that one can 
―[recognize] in a suitable notation […] the formal properties 
of propositions by mere inspection of the propositions 
themselves‖ (TLP 6.122). Axioms, i.e. formulae with an 
exceptional position within a logical system, are not need-
ed in this conception, because presuming a sufficient nota-
tion, which identifies the truth conditions of all formulae 
likewise, every formula ―is its own proof‖ (TLP 6.1265, cf. 
6.127f.): The proof does not consist in a derivation of for-
mulae from formulae of the same system but in a conver-
sion of the formula in the symbols of an ideal notation ac-
cording to a general procedure wholly depending on the 
syntax of the initial formula. Put concisely, the proof con-
ceptions can be opposed as follows. 
Proof conception of Old Logic:  
Axioms  formula 
The formula in question marks the end of the proof. It has 
to be a theorem in order to be provable. Proofs of the truth 
conditions of formulae not being theorems are not availa-
ble in this conception. 
Proof conception of New Logic:  
Any Formula  ideal symbol 
The ideal symbol identifies the truth conditions of the initial 
formula. Wittgenstein exemplifies his proof conception in 
TLP 6.1203 for propositional formulae by introducing a 
notation using brackets that is similar to the ab-notation. 
One might also think of the truth-table method as a well 
known procedure that realizes this proof conception basi-
cally. In case of truth-tables the ideal symbol consists of 
the assignment of truth values, T and F respectively, below 
the main sentential connective to the truth values of the 
propositional variables in the left part of the truth-table. 
The objective of the ab-notation is to realize such a proof 
conception for predicate logic. 
By the endeavour of Wittgenstein‘s New Logic it 
shall be demonstrated by purely logical means that an 
understanding of logic in the sense of an axiomatic theory, 
which is not based on purely syntactical grounds, is super-
fluous. It is not maintained that axiomatic proof systems 
are mistaken. However, in logic their form is misleading in 
so far it suggests that logic rests on some truth beyond 
symbols and their rule-governed manipulation and in so far 
it evokes problems as the foundation of axioms or the cor-
rectness and completeness of the axiomatic system, 
which, according to Wittgenstein‘s point of view, should be 
solved by changing the logical point of view rather than 
going beyond it. Thus, with the conception of New Logic a 
certain philosophical point of view concerning the under-
standing and foundation of logic is at stake. The ambitious 
objective is to justify stringently a Wittgensteinian under-
standing of logic by construing a logic system of an alter-
native form without delivering different logical results, i.e. 
without identifying truth conditions of formulae that they do 
not have according to classical logic. 
Wittgenstein‘s proof conception brings forth that 
syntax and semantic do not fall apart as in classical logic. 
By the proof procedure the truth conditions of the formulae 
become obvious. In this respect it provides a semantic in 
the sense of a theory defining truth conditions of formulae. 
Thus, it is not in need to be justified by some prior, inde-
pendent given semantics. This, of course, does not mean 
that it cannot be compared to classical semantics. Fur-
thermore, it should be demonstrable that both concepts of 
semantics are compatible, because otherwise not both 
would concern the same logic. Yet, the truth conditions 
need not to be identified by some procedure or some con-
siderations external to the syntactical manipulations of the 
proof procedure itself. Every step in the procedure is a 
step in clarifying the truth conditions and nothing more can 
and is to be done than defining the steps explicitly. In con-
sequence, not the question of correspondence of syntax 
and semantic is in the focus of Wittgenstein‘s conception 
but the question how an ideal notation looks like that iden-
tifies truth conditions of the formulae unambiguously and 
how a procedure can be defined in order to convert formu-
lae in the symbols of such an ideal notation. 
Wittgenstein‘s conception differs significantly from 
the traditional point of view by regarding the syntax of 
predicate logic as deficient because of the fact that the 
truth conditions of predicate formulae cannot be identified 
by relying on its syntactical features. Repeatedly he identi-
fies as the reason of his rejection of the syntax of predicate 
logic – the ―old notation‖ – that syntactically different for-
mulae might be equivalent. E.g. in NL, p. 102[3] he says 
(cf. NL, p. 93[1], TLP 5.43): 
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If p = not--not--p etc.; this shows that the traditional 
method of symbolism is wrong, since it allows a plurality 
of symbols with the same sense; and thence it follows 
that, in analyzing such propositions, we must not be 
guided by Russell's method of symbolizing. 
Commonly, the language of predicate logic is regarded as 
an ideal language in contrast to natural language, because 
it is set up recursively and it is unambiguous in so far every 
formula expresses a certain truth function of atomic propo-
sitions. However, according to Wittgenstein‘s point of view 
this is not sufficient, because identical truth functions can 
still be expressed differently. In this sense, the syntax of 
predicate logic shares a deficiency with natural language. 
The problem is not primarily that signs of different types 
are equivalent, but that no general syntactical criterion 
exists to identify equivalent symbols as equivalent (cf. NL, 
p. 94[3], p. 99[2], p. 101[7]). This gets manifest by consid-
ering equivalent formulae differing in several respects, 
such as the following formulae: 
(1) x1x2((Q x((yzIxyz  ¬Q)  (x3x4Hx3x4  
¬Q)))  ((¬Fx2  Gx1)  Hx2x1)) 
(2) ¬yx¬((¬Fx  Gy  P)  (¬Fx  Gy  ¬P)  Hxy) 
(3) yxHxy  y(x(¬Fx  Hxy)  Gy) 
According to classical logic it is possible to prove their 
equivalence by deducing one from the other. However, it is 
not possible to identify a syntactical feature that (1) to (3) 
have in common in virtue of that they are equivalent. The 
fact that the truth conditions cannot be identified by means 
of the syntax of predicate formulae also becomes evident if 
one considers non-equivalent formulae: The differences of 
their truth conditions cannot be identified by syntactic crite-
ria. Moreover, mostly it cannot even been proven syntacti-
cally that the formulae are not equivalent. 
In the framework of Wittgenstein‘s New Logic not 
laying down axiomatic calculi with certain metalogical 
properties is the first task of logic but solving the equiva-
lence problem. 
Equivalence problem: The equivalence problem is 
the problem to define a mechanical procedure such that 
the same symbol is assigned to every predicate formula of 
a class of equivalent formulae and different symbols are 
assigned to non-equivalent predicate formula in a finite 
number of steps. 
To solve this problem, syntactical differences of 
equivalent formulae must me minimized systematically. 
The symbols assigned to the formulae – in case of 
the ab-notation the ―ab-symbols‖ – shall identify the truth 
conditions of predicate formulae. This means that the ab-
symbols can be paraphrased by a mechanical procedure 
such that they denote common features of the models and 
counter-models of the initial formula. This, in turn, implies 
the possibility of construing the totality of models and 
counter-models from the ab-symbol of a formula without 
reckoning single interpretations. The understanding of 
logical proofs in the framework of New Logic can be char-
acterized as follows:  
Logical Proof: A proof according to the conception of 
New Logic consists in the application of a mechanical 
procedure assigning an ab-symbol to a predicate formu-
la identifying its conditions of truth and falsehood unam-
biguously. 
In how far this proof-conception will be realized is, in turn, 
to be measured against the extent of the solution of the 
equivalence problem and against the possibility of constru-
ing the totality of models and counter-models of a formula 
given merely its ab-symbol. The complete realization of 
this proof-conception is the core problem of logic according 
to the Wittgensteinian view. 
In fact, no satisfying answer to the question of the 
truth conditions of predicate formulae can be put forward in 
the framework of classical logical. Paraphrases of the for-
mulae identify their truth conditions just as little as the for-
mulae themselves. Derivations are only capable of identify-
ing internal relations between formulae. And in the frame-
work of classical semantics no general descriptions of the 
models and counter-models of a predicate formula can be 
delivered but only single models and counter-models (cf. 
Lampert (2006)). Even for subclasses of predicate logic 
that exceed propositional logic and monadic predicate 
logic no answer is given to the question of the truth condi-
tions of a predicate formula in terms of a mechanical pro-
duced, finite expression explicating the truth conditions of 
the formula in a satisfying manner. This is not only defi-
cient from the point of view of New Logic but from the per-
spective of everyone handling with predicate formulae and 
seeking to understand them. This deficiency should be 
resolved for as many subclasses of predicate logic as pos-
sible. Thus, the project to realize Wittgenstein‘s pro-
gramme of a New Logic is motivated by philosophical as 
well as by logical grounds. And its feasibility should be 
measured by the question to what extent the elaboration of 
Wittgenstein‘s ab-notation for first order logic is able to 
solve the equivalence problem. 
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